A.1 Further information about the Black Monday riots
More than seven years after its outbreak, vivid descriptions of the Black Monday riots continue to surface in the popular press in Sudan. In April 2012, a journalist writing for the daily newspaper Sudan Vision described being haunted by memories of the "worst wave of racial violence" he had ever witnessed: "On Black Monday, a group of South Sudanese young men captured three Northerners in a cotton store after pouring benzene on cotton sacks, and setting them on fire. The flames crashed the roof and reached more than five meters. The smoke was getting higher for the whole day!"
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In the lead-up to the referendum, the events of "Black Monday" became a rallying cry for some Northern elites, especially Al-Tayeb Mustafa (the uncle of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir and owner of one of the most widely read newspapers in Khartoum, Al-Intibaha), who regularly invoked the riots as evidence that Northerners and Southerners could not live together. In an interview with one of the authors, Mustafa described Black Monday as "another Torit mutiny" (referring to the first acts of revolt by Southerners against the central government when Southern soldiers mutinied in 1955, the year before Sudanese independence) and evidence that "fifty years after the mutiny Southern hatred for the North has not decreased. Instead war is now breaking out in the [capital] ." 2 In the wake of partition, Mustafa celebrated the South's secession for creating a "more homogeneous" country with people living in "greater harmony." Even as Sudan's economy began to deteriorate and fighting gripped its periphery,
Mustafa rejoiced at what he described as "the best time since independence in Sudan." Elite attempts to use Black Monday to promote a Northern ideology of separation suggest that the 2005 riots continued to loom large in the public consciousness five years after the events.
A.2 Additional information about sampling procedures
Sampling proceeded as follows. We first randomly sampled a set of five administrative units, which we stratified by dominant region of origin. For each AU, we obtained an estimate of which group dominates from 24 individual assessments made by locally knowledgeable research assistants. In a given AU, we considered a group dominant if (a) it has a plurality in a given AU, and (b) constitutes at least one-third of the population in that AU. If no group makes up at least one-third of the population, the AU was coded as mixed. AUs were grouped in five strata (North-Central, Darfur, Nuba, South, and mixed), and we selected one AU from each stratum, with selection probabilities proportional to AU population shares.
Second, we sampled 62 popular administrative units (PAUs), which we stratified by wealth and dominant region of origin within each AU. We only make inferences about areas under PAU administration, which excludes certain refugee camps under the supervision of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC). We oversampled PAUs where Darfurians, Nuba, or Southerners dominate, and otherwise allocated sampling units in proportion to stratum size. Table A .2 shows that our data is inconsistent with this logic. First, models (1) to (3) show that the effect of riot exposure on support for partition persists if we separate respondents by employment status.
Unemployed individuals, those who are not unemployed (i.e. who are either working or not participating in the labor force), and those who are working are all responsive to riot exposure, even though they presumably differ in their sensitivity to changes in economic conditions. Second, models (4) to (6) take advantage of the fact that we asked respondents what they believed the effect of partition on their personal economic status would be. If concerns about economic costs did in fact override the effect of riot exposure, we should be able to locate the effect of riot exposure only among those who are optimistic about the economic impact of partition. The opposite is the case: We find a correlation between riot exposure and opinions on partition for those who think partition will either have a negative or no effect on their economic status. In the eyes of these respondents, partition may be economically costly but the specter of violence in their neighborhoods makes it nevertheless worthwhile. Conversely, we find no effect of riot exposure on support for separation in the sample of respondents who are optimistic and think partition will have a positive effect on their economic status, because they are substantially more likely to favor partition with or without riot exposure: 32% of those optimistic about economic effects favor separation, compared to 9% of those who are pessimistic. Riot exposure thus appears to sway those who might otherwise be predisposed to oppose partition. Table 1 , and we plot a circle if the reestimated effect of riot exposure continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 95% level, and a triangle otherwise.
Not surprisingly, we need not worry about any unobserved confounder that is positively correlated with either the potentially endogenous regressor or the outcome and negatively correlated with the other, because such an omitted variable would bias us against finding a positive effect of riot exposure. But the sensitivity analysis shows that we should be concerned about spuriousness if the correlations between the omitted variable on the one hand and our dependent and independent variables of interest on the other hand have the same sign and are substantial, with a correlation coefficient of roughly .2 or higher.
It seems unlikely that such a confounder exists. For comparison's sake, Figure A .3 plots a number of crosses to indicate the relevant correlations for all of the control variables included in the baseline model. None of the correlations reach a level at which we would need to be concerned if we had failed to observe and condition on one of these variables. Noise in our data does not appear to be solely or even primarily responsible for these relatively low correlations, since we do observe high correlations involving the same variables, for example between father's education and a respondent's own education. In any case, if our data was particularly noisy, this should bias us against finding statistically significant results. 
